Entanglement as the world-making relation: Distance from entanglement by Jaksland, Rasmus
Entanglement as the world-making relation: Distance from
entanglement
Rasmus Jaksland∗
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
Norwegian University of Science and Technology – NTNU
Forthcoming in Synthese†
Abstract
Distance, it is often argued, is the only coherent and empirically adequate world-making
relation that can glue together the elements of the world. This paper offers entanglement
as an alternative world-making relation. Entanglement is interesting since it is consistent
even with quantum gravity theories that do not feature space at the fundamental level.
The paper thereby defends the metaphysical salience of such non-spatial theories.
An account of distance (space) is the predominant problem of empirical adequacy
facing entanglement as a world-making relation. A resolution of this obstacle utilizes
insights from the Ryu-Takayanagi formula (a holographic relation between entanglement
and spacetime) and Susskind and Maldacena’s related ER=EPR conjecture (a relation
between bell pairs and wormholes). Together these indicate how distance can be recov-
ered from entanglement and thus carves the way for entanglement fundamentalism.
1 Introduction
A number of our most prominent contending theories of quantum gravity – among them
causal set theory and loop quantum gravity – do not feature space at the fundamental
level of their ontology (Huggett and Wu¨thrich, 2013).1 In these ‘non-spatial’ theories
of quantum gravity, space is instead conjectured to be emergent from or reducible to
underlying non-spatial degrees of freedom, for instance non-metrical lattices or spin
∗email: rasmus.jaksland@ntnu.no
†This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Synthese. The final au-
thenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02671-7
1For further details about the disappearance and emergence of spacetime in loop quantum gravity
see Wu¨thrich (2017) and for causal set theory, see Wu¨thrich (2012). Even in string theory, the relation
between target space and spacetime is contested (Huggett, 2017).
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networks. But is a world metaphysically possible, if it does not feature distances as part
of its fundamental furniture?
Recently, some have suggested that this question should be answered in the negative
questioning the coherence (e.g. Hagar and Hemmo (2013) and Lam and Esfeld (2013))
and the very metaphysical salience (e.g. Maudlin (2007a) and Esfeld (2019)) of ontologies
without distance.2 Most outspoken is perhaps Michael Esfeld (2017; see also Esfeld
and Deckert (2017)), who argues that we need a relation – a world-making relation
– that can connect or glue together the elements of our ontology so they form one
world, and distance, according to Esfeld, is the only likely candidate for such a world-
making relation.3 While Esfeld’s want of a world-making relation is part of the larger
metaphysical program of minimalist ontology (which will not be assumed here), the need
for a world-making relation can be seen as originating in the apparent fact that we – and
the elements we surround ourselves with – belong to the same world: “given a plurality
of objects, there has to be a certain type of relations in virtue of which these objects
make up a world” (Esfeld and Deckert, 2017, 3). Distance offers itself as an immediate
candidate for such a relation; we are ‘world-mates’ in virtue of being at a distance from
each other. Even if distance is absent at the fundamental level as described by non-
spatial theories of quantum gravity, the question, however, remains what makes it true
that we are world-mates: “in this case, we need another world-making relation than the
spatial or spatiotemporal one” (Esfeld, 2019, 4). In the absence of such an alternative
to distance, Esfeld questions the apparent metaphysical import of these non-spatial
theories: “as things stand, it is reasonable to recommend caution about proposing far
reaching ontological consequences such as the disappearance of spacetime or fundamental
spatiotemporal relations” (Esfeld 2019, 13).
In this paper, the case will instead be made for an affirmative answer to the question
whether fundamentally non-spatial worlds are metaphysically possible and at that, an
affirmative answer that should be satisfactory even by the standards of minimalist on-
tology. Entanglement, it will be proposed, can serve as the fundamental relation that
constitutes a world and from which distance (and possibly all other relations) is de-
rived.4 Where an ontology with distance as the fundamental relation is at tension with
2In addition to these explicit metaphysical worries about non-spatial theories of quantum gravity, one
might expect that the caution towards such theories is shared by those who prefer the Bohmian interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics out of a concern for the absence of local beables in other interpretations;
especially those expressing a sympathy for Humean supervenience (e.g. Loewer (1996), Maudlin (2007b),
and Miller (2014)). Also, the primitive ontology program (most often pursued in the context of quantum
mechanics) explicitly requires that “any satisfactory fundamental physical theory [. . . ] contains a meta-
physical hypothesis about what constitutes physical objects [. . . ] which lives in three-dimensional space
or space-time and constitutes the building blocks of everything else” (Allori, 2015, 107). According to
(this strand of) primitive ontology, space is a precondition for any satisfactory metaphysics of a physical
theory. Finally, proponents of spacetime state realism (e.g. Wallace and Timpson (2010)) might share
this preference for spatial ontologies.
3See Wallace (2018, section 8) for a recent criticism of such metaphysical biases in the context of
quantum physics.
4In arguing that elements make up a world in virtue of being entangled, it follows that the branching,
but entangled worlds of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics comprise only one world. It
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the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity,5 entanglement is arguably compatible with
these theories: Entanglement is low maintenance in the sense that it can occur in any
system with quantum degrees of freedom. It should therefore feature in any theory of
quantum gravity. In this regard, entanglement is a promising world-making relation; it is
a candidate for a fundamental relation that can build even the fundamentally non-spatial
worlds of quantum gravity.
However, answering the question ‘what makes it true that we are worldmates?’ with
entanglement involves a metaphysical commitment that goes beyond the usual recogni-
tion in quantum mechanics of non-local phenomena and non-separable quantum states.
It involves, in the terminology of Glick and Darby (2019), an entanglement realism: that
there is real entanglement in the world. Entanglement realism is in itself not new and is
also defended, in one form or another, by for instance Teller (1986), Morganti (2009), and
Calosi (2014). No one, however, has hitherto argued for entanglement fundamentalism:
The view that entanglement is the only fundamentally real relation, though Lam (2013,
67-68) alludes to the possibility. However, already in endorsing entanglement realism,
the account of entanglement as the world-making relation is vulnerable to some recent
objections to entanglement realism. Since entanglement seems to disappear upon mix-
ing, Seevinck (2006) argues that entanglement cannot be ontologically robust. Healey
(2012) argues in a similar fashion, based on delayed-choice entanglement-swapping ex-
periments, that entanglement cannot be real. Finally, Schaffer (2010) has argued that
entanglement cannot be a single relation since both two, three and N particles can be
entangled. Neither will be dealt with here, and the reader is referred to Timpson and
Brown (2010) for a reply to Seevinck, Egg (2013) and Glick (2019) for a reply to Healey,
and in reply to Schaffer, it will be observed that entanglement can always be regarded
as a relation between a subsystem and the rest of the system (see section 3 for further
details and Morganti (2009) for further discussion).
In any case, these challenges to entanglement realism are dwarfed by the ensuing
challenges to the more radical entanglement fundamentalism and its claim that entan-
glement is the world-making relation: how to account for the varied phenomena of both
intricate experiments and our everyday world; most prominently in this regard those of
distances and generally spatial extension. Though more can and must in general be said
about the empirical adequacy of entanglement as the world-making relation, only an
account of distance from entanglement will be taken up here. But notice that with such
an account, entanglement should be just as empirically adequate, and thus hopefully as
successful a world-making relation, as distance. Getting distance from entanglement,
however, is no simple matter, and the argument to this effect utilizes recent research
on a holographic relation between entanglement and spacetime proposed by Ryu and
is left for the reader to decide whether this counts for or against entanglement as the world-making
relation. See Skyrms (1976) and Percival (2013) for further discussion of the relation between possible
worlds and the branching worlds of the Everett interpretation. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer of
Synthese for bringing this consequence to my attention.
5It should be mentioned that there are attempts to develop Bohmian mechanics on shape space that
might extend to quantum gravity (Du¨rr et al., 2018). Thus, there is still the hope to save distance as
the world-making relation even in quantum gravity.
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Takayanagi (2006) and advanced by van Raamsdonk and collaborators (2010a; 2014).
The argument will also draw on the related ER=EPR conjecture due to Maldacena
and Susskind (2013) that proposes a relation between entanglement and Einstein-Rosen
bridges (wormholes). Together, it is argued, these schemes indicate that space, spatial
connectivity, and distance can be related to entanglement such that distances might be
recovered from entanglement. Here, ‘indicate’ and ‘might’ must be emphasized. The
account does not demonstrate that entanglement is the world-making relation, or that
we can actually recover all of space from entanglement; for such conclusiveness, the
quantum gravity research has to advance significantly. Instead, the modest claim of
this paper is that quantum gravity research – in its current preliminary stage – features
surprising relations between space and entanglement that render entanglement the most
promising candidate for a world-making relation in worlds (possible, and perhaps even
most likely, including the actual world) where distance is absent at the fundamental
level.
The account of entanglement as the world-making relation is modelled on the mini-
malist ontology of distanced matter points proposed by Esfeld (2017) and developed in
further detail by Esfeld and Deckert (2017). Here distance serves as the world-making
relation that grounds spatial extension, individuates simple objects – the matter points
– and accounts for change in the world. The first issue, extension, is the central concern
of the present paper, while the latter two roles of a world-making relation in minimalist
ontology will be the topic of a companion piece to this one. In modelling itself on this
ontology of distanced matter points, the account of entanglement as the world making
relation has the ambition to be a real alternative to distance in the minimalist ontol-
ogy. Both the entanglement and distance relation can ground spatial extension, or so it
will be argued in section 5, and neither fares better than the other in dealing with the
counterexample discussed in section 6 of two entangled particles moving away from each
other. Entanglement, however, has the advantage of being consistent even with non-
spatial theories of quantum gravity; in contrast with the ontology of distanced matter
points.
A contentious element of the ontology of distanced matter points is the matter points
themselves. If these are meant to be permanent, discernible, local beables6, they are
suspicious from the perspective of most non-Bohmian interpretations of quantum me-
chanics and due to the observer dependence of particle number in quantum field theory
(Unruh, 1976). It is therefore important to stress that the proposal to conceive of en-
tanglement as the world-making relation involves no commitment to such permanent,
local matter points. As explicated further below, the entanglement relation is a relation
between a subsystem and the rest of the system and all it requires is therefore a notion
of subsystem. Since space and distance are absent in the fundamental ontology with
entanglement as the world-making relation, these subsystems cannot be local beables.
However, if their spatial connotations are left behind, matter points do seem compatible
with such subsystems and thus with entanglement as the world-making relation. In con-
6In the sense of Bell (2001).
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ceiving entanglement as the world-making relation, proponents of minimalist ontology
can therefore preserve most of its metaphysical framework simply with distance replaced
by entanglement, while those suspicious of matter points can construe the account more
abstractly in terms of subsystems. With the present ambition to offer an alternative
world-making relation, the exact ontological character of the relata will only be touched
upon in section 7 and a deeper investigation of this ontology will, for the most part,
be postponed to future work. For now, the proposed ontology will simply be denoted
‘entangled subsystems’ with the suggestion that the subsystems are not imbued with too
much ontological significance beyond their formal characteristics.
The paper proceeds as follows: The first section below introduces world-making. This
is followed in section 3 by the development of a definition of entanglement that is inde-
pendent of references to distances. Section 4 remarks on some quantum field theoretic
aspects of entanglement, before it is indicated how entanglement might account for
distance, space and extension (section 5). Section 6 refutes the most obvious counterex-
ample to an account of distance in terms of entanglement: That particles can move away
from one another without changing their entanglement. It is argued how this counterex-
ample relies on too simple a conception of the proposed relation between distance and
entanglement. In this light, section 7 gives a more thorough presentation of the meta-
physical conjecture that entanglement is the world-making relation before the conclusion
(section 8) summarizes the findings and returns where it started: Quantum gravity.
Along the way, several relevant themes will be left unexplored. In combination with
the somewhat controversial nature of the physics relied upon, the present account of the
ontology of entangled subsystems is perhaps best regarded as programmatic. Still, the
hope is to at least suggest the initial viability of this type of entanglement fundamental-
ism and thus to invite consideration and further study of ontologies with a central role
for entanglement.
2 World-making (in minimalist ontology)
The quest for a world-making relation has its origin in Lewis’ metaphysics where it finds
a role both in the Humean supervenience thesis (Lewis, 1994) and in his modal realism.
By the latter, all the possible worlds exist, and Lewis therefore needs some explana-
tion why something belongs to one rather than another of these worlds. He needs, in
other words, an answer to how two entities can be recognized as worldmates: “things
are worldmates iff they are spatiotemporally related. A world is unified, then, by the
spatiotemporal interrelation of its parts” (Lewis, 1986, 71). For Lewis, both the no-
tion of world and the worldmate relation are grounded in spatiotemporal relations. As
Wu¨thrich (2019) observes, this generates a tension between Lewisian metaphysics and
non-spatial theories of quantum gravity. However, as Darby (2009) observes, Lewis re-
garded his thesis as fallible. Another “analogically spatiotemporal” relation could be the
“worldmate relation” (Lewis, 1986, 77) and still provide for a consistent metaphysics.
By analogically spatiotemporal Lewis (1986, 75-76) means relations that are natural,
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pervasive, discriminating, and external.7 Entanglement is immediately promising as an
analogically spatiotemporal relation: entanglement is an external relation that – by the
argument of section 4 – is pervasive. As will be argued in the companion piece, entangle-
ment is also discriminating which leaves only its naturalness for debate. Entanglement
might, in other words, relieve the tension between Lewisian metaphysics and non-spatial
theories of quantum gravity. The aim here, however, is not Lewis exegesis, and the exact
extent to which entanglement qualifies as an analogically spatiotemporal relation that
fulfils the needs of Lewis’ worldmate relation is the topic for another occasion.
While inspired by Lewis, Esfeld and Deckert (2017, 56) explicitly state that they are
neutral about the metaphysics of modality. The Lewisian inspiration for their minimal-
ist ontology is instead the Humean supervenience thesis; adopting, however, the more
radical super-Humean version of it which Esfeld explicates as follows:
While the standard Humean, following Lewis’s thesis of Humean superve-
nience [...], holds that there are spatial or spatiotemporal relations connect-
ing points and natural intrinsic properties instantiated at these points, the
Super-Humean maintains that there are only sparse points that then are mat-
ter points with distance relations individuating these points (Esfeld, 2017, 8).
With the matter points having no intrinsic properties and in being individuated8 by
the distance relations, “there is nothing more to these objects than standing in these
relations” (Esfeld and Deckert, 2017, 3). Super-Humenism provides for a minimalist
ontology in distance being the only moving part: Distance grounds the plurality of matter
points. Distance connects these otherwise detached matter points into a configuration.
Any change of this configuration consists of variations of the relative distances between
the matter points. Distance relations are the relations in virtue of which the matter
points make up a world. Distance, Esfeld and Deckert (2017) argue, is the world-making
relation that together with the matter points it itself individuates comprise the best
candidate for a coherent and empirically adequate minimalist ontology of the natural
world.9
While there is this rather straightforward sense in which distance makes the world
of Esfeld and Deckert’s minimalist ontology, one may rightfully wonder if this notion
of world-making connects at all with that associated with Lewis’ modal realism. Esfeld
and Deckert, like Lewis, argue that distance is world-making because it is the relation in
virtue of which the elements of the ontology make up a world. However, this question,
how are two entities recognized as worldmates, seems to carry a different significance
7For further details and discussion, see Darby (2009, 196-201).
8This in such a way that the objects are absolutely discernible rather than merely weakly discernible.
See Saunders (2006) for more on this difference.
9In a few more words, a minimalist ontology is one that posits as few (types of) elements as possible
and requires the minimal number of different relations between these elements. In addition, the posited
elements and relations themselves have to be simple. In summary, a minimalist ontology must satisfy a
general parsimony criterion. Whether the ontology of entangled subsystems satisfies this criterion will
also be discussed in the companion piece.
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once detached from modal realism. The question no longer concerns why they belong to
the same world rather than different worlds among all the existing ones. And relatedly,
if only the actual world exists, then two entities could be argued to be worldmates
simply in virtue of existing; the appeal to distance thus seems superfluous.10 In my
view, however, there are at least affinities between Lewis’ worldmate relation and world-
making as it features in minimalist ontology. For Esfeld and Deckert, it appears, not all
existing entities have to be distanced: “We conceive the distance relations as establishing
the order of what coexists” (Esfeld and Deckert, 2017, 7, emphasis added). As the
world-making relation, distance defines a configuration and thus establishes what exists
together at an instant in time. Though Esfeld and Deckert never consider the possibility,
an imagined set of matter points – each associated with a list of their distances to other
matter points – might prove to comprise of two spatially disconnected configurations.
The matter points would form two configurations rather than one in virtue of the distance
relations that obtain between the matter points. Both configurations would exist; one
could possibly conceive of them as two decoupled sections of a multiverse. However, only
the matter points within each configuration would coexist, whereas the two decoupled
configurations would not coexist. In this sense, spatial distance establishes what coexists.
In Lewis’ metaphysics, spatiotemporal relations has an analogous role: If Lewis were
given a set of entities, the spatiotemporal relations between them would tell him how
many possible worlds they were gathered from. Due to the differences in the ontologies,
the possible types of entities in Lewis’ set of entities are very different from those of
Esfeld and Deckert’s set which only admits matter points and possibly only those of the
actual world. This, however, is a question about the type of entities of the ontology –
the relata – and not about the role of the relations it features. In particular, a single
notion of world-making relation seems to be able to capture both cases well, despite
their differences:
Definition: The world-making relation is the relation that accounts for the
connectedness in the ontology including why some elements may be com-
pletely detached from one another.11
It is arguably a stretch to say that this definition captures all the subtleties of Lewis’
worldmate relation, but it at least covers the idea that it is the spatiotemporal interrela-
tions that unify a world and, by the same argument, why different worlds are not unified
but instead decoupled from each other. As regards Esfeld and Deckert, the definition is
still consistent with their agnosticism whether there actually are any decoupled sectors;
either in the form of other possible worlds or disconnected parts of a single multiverse.
With or without such decoupled sectors, the world-making relation accounts for the
10Thank you to an anonymous reviewer of Synthese for pressing me on this issue.
11One might object that this relation is not world-making, but making connectedness in the world.
Calling this relation ‘world-making,’ however, can be motivated if we, like Lewis, do not take ‘world’
as a primitive but rather introduce ‘world’ as “a maximal mereological sum of worldmates” (Darby,
2009, 196) where worldmates in turn are exactly those entities connected by the world-making relation.
This usage of ‘world-making’ also follows the recent use in the literature on the metaphysics of quantum
gravity (see in particular Esfeld (2019)).
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connectedness of the ontology as exemplified by distance when it – in the minimalist
ontology – establishes the coexistence of matter points.
As such, the need for a world-making relation neither depends on modal realism nor on
minimalist ontology. Rather, it originates in the aspiration to account for the apparent
fact that we and our surroundings at every instance in time do form a connected whole.
More abstractly, the world-making relation is meant to account for the fact that certain
collections of (token) objects of the actual ontology are connected to one another or, if
there are structures all the way down, it explains what connects these structures both
internally and externally. The world-making relation must, in other words, explain why
this whole of elements – they being objects or structures – of the ontology make up one
rather than two or more configurations. This is not to say that we cannot conceive of
a world without a world-making relation; a world of Leibnizian monads might be an
example. However, it would be surprising if the absence of distance in quantum gravity
required for the return of monads. The motivation of the present project is therefore to
explore first the ontologically more parsimonious possibility that the non-spatial theories
of quantum gravity just feature another world-making relation than distance, namely
entanglement. In the absence of spatial distance, entanglement is proposed to be the glue
that connects the elements of the ontology. As such, I argue that this investigation of
entanglement as the world-making relation is relevant regardless of one’s view on modal
realism or minimalist ontology.
In being a possible replacement for distance as the world-making relation, entangle-
ment is still of particular interest to Lewisian metaphysics, as indicated above, and to
minimalist ontology. While the program of minimalist ontology has its outset in a search
for the relation that binds matter points together, a world-making relation, the program
is minimalist by the hypothesis that the world-making relation also individuates the mat-
ter points and accounts for all change. While Esfeld and Deckert recognize that their
minimalist ontology is fallible, i.e. that one could replace distance as the world-making
relation, Esfeld elsewhere observes that ”no one has hitherto worked out a proposal for
another type of relations than distances that could (a) do the trick of individuating sim-
ple objects and (b) be empirically adequate” (Esfeld, 2017, 4). What I contend is that
entanglement can meet this challenge.12
To be an empirically adequate world-making relation in minimalist ontology, Esfeld
proposes the necessary (but not sufficient) conditions that the world-making relation
“introduces an evolution of the configuration” (Esfeld, 2017, 4) and that it can “qual-
ify as providing for extension” (Esfeld, 2017, 4). Intuitively, we might motivate these
empirical adequacy conditions as originating in a requirement that the world-making
relation must at least be able to support the reality of motion (in space). This fact,
as explicated by the condition of evolution and extension, is to be accounted for in the
minimalist ontology by the world-making relation as it obtains between the objects it
itself individuates; the evolution of the configuration, for instance, can ensue as changes
12Interestingly, Esfeld has also entertained this possibility, or so it seems from his remark elsewhere
that “what there is at the basic level of the world are relations of quantum entanglement” (Esfeld, 2004,
616).
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in the magnitude of these relations (assuming that the world-making relation is quantifi-
able). The minimalist ontology, in other words, require more than connectedness from
the world-making relation. Nevertheless, I claim that entanglement can do just as well
as distance in meeting these requirements. This claim will not be defended here in its
entirety. A companion piece to this one will argue that entanglement can achieve indi-
viduation and thereby determine a configuration and its evolution. The task taken up
presently is primarily to show how entanglement can “qualify as providing for extension.”
Though the account as such is part of a larger minimalist program, it is on its own an
attempt to show that entanglement is an alternative to distance as the type relation in
virtue of which the elements of the world are unified.
The conjecture, however, is not simply that entanglement can replace distance in
worlds where distance is absent. This would be insufficient to defend the metaphysical
salience of non-spatial theories of quantum gravity; another aim of this paper. These
theories are not meant to be descriptions of esoteric worlds without space. Rather, they
try to account for the physics of the actual world where distance, space, and extension are
manifest but – according to these theories – emergent. The conjecture, therefore, is that
the elements of the actual world make up a (connected) world in virtue of being entangled
and not in virtue of being distanced. Assuming space is absent at the fundamental level
of the ontology – thus disqualifying it as the world-making relation – this conjecture can
be defended based solely the pervasiveness of entanglement as discussed in section 4.
However, without a relation between distance and entanglement, the emergence of space
would be a miracle in this ontology: We would be no closer at an answer to what grounds
distance relations. With distance no longer acting as the world-making relation, such
an account might be less urgent from the perspective of metaphysical coherence, but
it certainly remains as part of the empirical adequacy of the ontology (as suggested by
Esfeld). It is therefore this stronger program that will be pursued here: How an ontology
of entangled subsystems can (1) make a world where (2) spatial distances are manifest,
but non-fundamental. To achieve (1), entanglement must be pervasive enough to be a
candidate for the relation in virtue of which the elements of the actual world are unified.
To achieve (2), the entanglement structure must be shown to be rich enough to account
for distance relations and in doing so presumably “qualify as providing for extension.”
The qualification ‘presumably’ is added since Esfeld is never quite clear what exactly
this empirical adequacy conditions amounts to, however, distance, we are told, satisfies
it (Esfeld, 2017, 4). If entanglement can account for distance and distance satisfies the
extension condition, then so does entanglement.13 Thus, if entanglement satisfies (1)
and (2), it proposes itself as a world-making relation for a minimalist ontology though
it remains to be shown that entanglement can account for individuation and change.14
13Notice how this might also contribute to an account of individuation and change from entangle-
ment. If entanglement can account for distance and distance can achieve individuation and change, then
entanglement should be able to do the same.
14The minimalist ontology also requires that the world-making relation is the only relation. While
entanglement might indeed candidate as the single relation from which all other relations derive, this
view cannot be justified by the present argument which is strictly limited to distance. Relative charge,
for instance, might for all said here have independent existence from entanglement. With that said, I do
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How to recover space in each of the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity is an
active field of research which has not yet produced any conclusive results. The present
account of distance from entanglement does not resolve this problem. Accordingly, it is
not demonstrating how distance can be recovered from entanglement. Rather, the ambi-
tion is to indicate that physics usually described in terms of distance (and more generally
space) also admits a description in terms of entanglement. Such re-descriptions are sym-
metric whereby distance and entanglement are on equal footing in these instances. This,
however, does not obstruct the asymmetry entailed in entanglement accounting for dis-
tance. Rather, these instances will be employed to argue that distance is a particular
type of entanglement structure and that changes of distance are particular changes of
these structures. This paves the way for the proposal that distance supervenes on en-
tanglement; that there can be no change of distance without change of entanglement.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that most entanglement structures and changes of entan-
glement do not admit a description in terms of distances or space. This is the sense
in which entanglement accounts for distance and why entanglement is to be regarded
as more fundamental.15 Explicating fundamentality like this, the present proposal con-
forms to the recent conceptualization of how space is non-fundamental in non-spatial
theories of quantum gravity: “the relationship between spatiotemporal and quantum
gravitational structures is best understood in terms of some relevant functional (rather
than constitutive) roles these latter instantiate in appropriate circumstances” (Lam and
Wu¨thrich, 2018, 12). For the generic spin-network states of loop quantum gravity, for
instance, special circumstances have to obtain in order for the state to admit a descrip-
tion as extended space. Space occurs when the underlying degrees of freedom play a
particular role; space is a function in this sense. As Lam and Wu¨thrich (2018) put it:
“Spacetime is as spacetime does. No more, no less” (12). In this light, one might re-
gard the present proposal as partaking in this program attempting to indicate that the
distance role can be filled by entanglement.
3 An independent definition of entanglement
The minimalist ontology of distanced matter points employs a similar functionalist strat-
egy in its analysis of properties such as mass, charge, and entanglement:
“they are defined in terms of the effects that they bring about under certain
conditions – in other words, by the functional or causal role that they exercise
for the evolution of the objects to which they are attributed” (Esfeld, 2017,
14).
This sits well with the standard explication of entanglement as a correlation between
outcomes of measurements on two particles. Suppose that we repeatedly measure the
find such entanglement fundamentalism compelling and worthy of further exploration.
15See Oriti (2009) for further discussion of this relation between scope and fundamentality in the
context of quantum gravity.
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spin of two fermions and that we for both particles measure spin up half of the time and
spin down half of the time. In addition we find, as we compare the series of measurements
of the two particles, that when one particle is spin up the other particle is found to have
spin down. It is this and similar correlations peculiar to quantum mechanics that we
identify as entanglement.16
An immediate worry is that this characterization of entanglement in terms of certain
statistics relies too closely on a measurement context in space. Thus, if entanglement
cannot be explicated in any other way, then it might depend on space in its very def-
inition. Entanglement, however, may be defined independently of these appeals to the
statistics in outcomes of measurements.17 Suppose we know the state, |Ψ〉, of some quan-
tum system as defined by the Hilbert space H. Decomposing H into two subsystems,
we have
H = HA ⊗HB (1)
where HA and HB are the Hilbert spaces of the two subsystems (denoted A and B
respectively).18 In the example above, the natural choice would be to treat each particle
as a subsystem associated with their respective Hilbert spaces. One can then define the
reduced density matrix, ρ, for one of the subsystems as:
ρA = trB(|Ψ〉 〈Ψ|) =
∑
i
〈
ψBi
∣∣∣ (|Ψ〉 〈Ψ|) ∣∣∣ψBi 〉 (2)
where
∣∣∣ψBi 〉 spanHB. Having thus obtained an expression for the reduced density matrix
for subsystem A, we say that this subsystem is entangled with the rest of the system
if and only if the reduced density matrix, ρA, has more than one non-zero eigenvalue.
Entanglement is in other words the failure of the full system to be represented by a
product of pure states of the two subsystems.
This demonstrates that entanglement can be defined independently of the notion of
distance. However, as shown by Earman (2015), this definition of entanglement is not
without its subtleties. To rule out all states, where the failure to factorize as product
states can be a consequence of classical mechanisms (including hidden variables), it will
be assumed here that the whole system (the universe) is in a pure state and that any
single subsystem is entangled with the full system in such a way the Bell inequalities
16The more precise statement of this: If |Ψ〉 is not a product state of HA and HB , it follows that a pure
state,
∑
i
ci
∣∣ψAi 〉, cannot give the same outcomes as |Ψ〉 for measurements on subsystem A. However,
the outcome of such measurements can be reproduced by a mixture: some ensemble of orthogonal states
in HA, where each of these states, {
∣∣ψAi 〉}, are associated with a (classical) probability, pi, of finding the
system in that state when making the measurement on A.
17Still, we need measurement to know about entanglement, and a related worry is therefore that of the
empirical coherence of non-spatial theories: “if the local beables and the locations are removed from the
physical ontology, it is hard to see how evidential contact with the world is to be made [...]” (Maudlin,
2007a, 3160). See Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013) for a response to this problem.
18Some complications are involved in making such a decomposition in quantum field theory in a gauge
invariant way; something that naively leads to an unphysical gauge fixing dependence of the entanglement
entropy (Casini et al., 2014). These complications will not be considered here, but see Delcamp et al.
(2016) and references therein for various (proposed) resolutions of this problem.
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are violated. The notion of entanglement adopted here is therefore equivalent to what
Earman (2015, 313) calls (E3) or Bell entanglement.19
Having sorted out these subtleties in the definition of entanglement, the next ques-
tion is how to quantify it. Given the reduced density matrix for a subsystem, ρA, the
entanglement between the subsystem and the rest of the system may be quantified in
terms of the von Neumann entropy, SA:
SA = − tr(ρA log(ρA)). (3)
However, even with the quantification of entanglement in terms of the von Neumann
entropy, it remains a relation between a subsystem and the rest of the system. Thus, it
is not (manifestly) a relation between two subsystems in contrast with the ontology of
distanced matter points, where every matter point is related to any other by a distance
relation. A relation constructed from entanglement entropy that is more analogous to
the distance relation is mutual information:
I(A,B) = S(A) + S(B)− S(A ∪B) (4)
where S(M) is the entanglement entropy between a subsystem, M , and the rest of the
system.
Mutual information shares a number of the structuring properties of the distance rela-
tion. Since von Neumann entropy satisfies subadditivity, SAB ≤ SA+SB, it follows that
I(A,B) ≥ 0, i.e. mutual information quantifies the entanglement between subsystems
by a non-negative scalar. Mutual information is symmetric since A ∪B = B ∪A and it
is connex since I(A,B) is well defined for all subsystems. However, mutual information
is not irreflexive: I(A,A) = S(A) +S(A)−S(A∪A) = S(A) 6= 0 and it does not satisfy
the triangle inequality. Mutual information is not distance. When it is here proposed
that entanglement can be the world-making relation, it does not entail that distances
can simply be exchanged for mutual information. This is obvious from the difference in
their structuring properties, but the point generalizes: No entanglement-based relation
is trivially interchangeable with distance.
What has been achieved so far is a definition of entanglement independent of distance
in the well known framework of quantum mechanics. However, since the account of
extension from entanglement will take place in relativistic quantum field theory, it is
relevant to stress some differences between these two theories when it comes to entan-
glement before we proceed to the account itself.
4 Entanglement in quantum field theory
As the name suggests, relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) is a theory of relativistic
quantum fields or more precisely quantized operator valued fields; a quantum mechan-
ics for systems with infinitely many degrees of freedom (see Ruetsche (2012a,b) for a
19As shown by Ladyman et al. (2013), this notion of entanglement ensures that we only include genuine
entanglement even in the case of indistinguishable fermions.
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philosophical introduction). In the RQFT formalism, particles are treated as excitations
of these quantum fields.20 This entails that we cannot conceive of entanglement as the
correlation between the properties of permanent particles such as their spin. In RQFT,
entanglement instead obtains as correlations between the fields of a subsystem and the
rest of the system. Thus, it is the quantum fields that are entangled. For a RQFT
defined on a background spacetime, such a subsystem could comprise of the fields living
on some subregion of that background spacetime. Entanglement would in this case take
the form of correlations between the excitations (real or virtual) of the fields inside and
outside of this region. This can still be captured by the formalism above:21 A is the
spacetime region and |ΨA〉 ∈ HA is the collective quantum state of the quantum fields
living on A. If we define B to be the compliment of A (i.e. the rest of the background
spacetime) such that HB is the Hilbert space for the rest of the system, then we can
find the reduced density matrix, ρA, by eq. (2). We can then use eq. (3) to evaluate
the entanglement entropy and thus how much the subsystem is entangled with the rest
of the system. All we have to remember is that it is now the quantum fields that are
entangled.
In the algebraic approach to RQFT, a number of interesting results can be shown re-
garding entanglement that have direct bearing on its potential role as the world-making
relation.22 This is not the place to review the algebraic approach to RQFT or the details
of the arguments establishing these results. Rather, these results will be taken as given,
and further details can be acquired from the references. The first result is that spacelike
separated quantum field subsystems are highly entangled even in the vacuum state of
a RQFT due to vacuum fluctuations (Redhead, 1995).23 This result is generalized by
Clifton and Halvorson (2001): spacelike separated quantum field subsystems are entan-
gled in generic RQFT states (even considering non-interacting, free fields). As Swanson
(2019) observes: “Such states encompass many (if not all) physically reasonable global
states” (10). In other words, only in very special (and most likely non-physical) RQFT
states are there spacelike separated quantum field subsystems that are not entangled.
In addition, this generic entanglement can be proved to violate Bell-inequalities and
thus satisfies Earman’s (E3) (Summers and Werner, 1987; Halvorson and Clifton, 2000).
20It is disputed whether the ontology of RQFT is one of particles or fields. See Baker (2016) for a
recent survey.
21Truth be told, there are indications that the Hilbert space formalism faces some difficulties in RQFT.
In a nutshell, the problem is that the high amount of entanglement in RQFT states entails that not even
a mixed state in HA uniquely determines the subsystem (see also footnote 18). Swanson (2019) discusses
this problem in the context of spacetime state realism that in section 7 below is argued to resemble the
ontology of entangled subsystem (aside from the spacetime part). Swanson’s proposed solution in terms
algebraic RQFT might therefore also be applicable to entangled subsystems. We shall here stick with
the Hilbert space formalism – despite its issues – since this is the formalism used in the quantum gravity
literature referenced throughout section 5. How this affects the analysis of section 5 will be left for future
work.
22See Swanson (2017) for an introduction, comparison, and discussion of the different approaches to
RQFT.
23This may come as no surprise. Already in quantum mechanics, the vacuum state of for instance the
coupled harmonic oscillator is also highly entangled (Srednicki, 1993).
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Based on these results, Lam (2013) concludes “that entanglement (non-locality) is a
universal feature of physical quantum field systems in the sense that all quantum field
systems (including free, non-interacting ones) satisfying certain physically reasonable
conditions tend to be ultimately entangled (in particular with their environment under-
stood as their causal complement)” (66, emphasis in original). However, entanglement
is not only universal and generic in RQFT, it is also very difficult to remove. Again
by means of the algebraic approach, Clifton and Halvorson (2001) show that for generic
RQFT states “[t]here are many regions of spacetime within which no local operations
can be performed that will disentangle that region’s state from that of its spacelike
complement” (28). Valente (2010) qualifies that it is necessary (but not sufficient) for
disentanglement by a local operation that the two regions are strictly spacelike separated,
i.e. that they remain spacelike separated even if one is displaced by a small amount.
This entails that it is always impossible to completely disentangle a RQFT subsystem
(on a spacelike region) from the rest of the system, since they are not strictly spacetime
separated. Such systems are intrinsically entangled.
Being quantum field theories themselves, it is likely that these results carry to the
theories of quantum gravity of interest here, and we shall simply proceed on this as-
sumption. The results testify to the pervasiveness of entanglement between spacelike
separated degrees of freedom. In all (physically reasonable) states, spacelike separated
subsystems are entangled. Since all elements in the ontology of distanced matter point
are spacelike separated (presumably by definition), entanglement thus relates all the
elements related by distance.
In light of these results coming out of algebraic RQFT, Lam (2013) proposes an
ontology that takes entanglement seriously:
the ontology of (the algebraic approach to) RQFT is an ontology of ‘entan-
glement structures’, understood in the sense of networks of entanglement
relations among quantum field systems whose existence – what it means for
a quantum field system to be the one it is – depends on the entanglement
relations they enter into and on the structures they are part of (Lam, 2013,
67-68).
This type of ontology will serve as a template for the ontology of entangled subsystems
in the account of distance from entanglement. However, with this aim in mind, one may
wonder what happened, in the explication of this ontology, to space and the apparently
central role for it in the exposition above. Likewise, the ambition for entanglement is
moreover to be the relation in virtue of which elements make up world even when no
spatial description is available whereby being spacelike separated is ill-defined.
While entanglement certainly can relate degrees of freedom even in the absence of a
spatial description, both worries are warranted. The typical set-up of RQFT, both in the
algebraic and field formulation, assumes a fixed background spacetime. The more general
worry would therefore be that this hinders the utility of RQFT for the present purposes
since it has an inbuilt ontological commitment to space(time). Indeed, in the algebraic
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approach, the algebras are associated with regions of spacetime. Against this, Dieks
(2001) argues that the background spacetime can be regarded as auxiliary, and that we
can simply take the total algebra and the structure of subalgebras as primitive (in the
Hilbert space formalism, we could similarly take the full Hilbert space and the Hilbert
space of all possible subsystems as primitive).24 These algebras contain the entanglement
structure such that this construction admits questions about the entanglement between
subsystems to be formulated independently of any background spacetime. Still, the
pervasiveness of entanglement beyond spacelike separation remains unknown, though
perhaps only due to the lack of systematic scrutiny of the spacetime-free context.25
Taking the algebras as ontologically primitive also (re)introduces the problem – as Dieks
(2001, 237) recognizes – of getting space out this abstract structure; be it algebras or
Hilbert spaces. How this problem might be resolved within algebraic RQFT will not be
discussed here.26 Notice instead that the ontology promoted here is not eliminative of
space. Space exists, it is just derivative from entanglement. Thus, it is meaningful to ask
if two subsystems are spacelike separated under the assumption that the entanglement
structure of the full system admits a spatial description. This will exactly be the case
where the results from algebraic RQFT are put to use below. However, the account of
space is instead developed based on results coming out of quantum gravity research, as
detailed in the next section.
5 Extension from entanglement
For the minimalist ontology of distanced matter points, extension is a feature not a
difficulty. For the prospective minimalist ontology of entangled subsystems, extension
seems like an insurmountable obstacle. Two recent research programs will here be ap-
pealed to in the development of an account of how distances might be recovered from
entanglement: the conjectured relation between entanglement and areas of spacetime
due to Ryu and Takayanagi (2006), and the ER=EPR conjecture due to Maldacena and
Susskind (2013) that relates Einstein Rosen bridges (wormholes) to entanglement.
The Ryu-Takayanagi formula is originally conceived in the context of the AdS/CFT
correspondence; a conjectured string duality.27 Here it is sufficient to know that the
AdS/CFT correspondence implies the physical equivalence between certain (semi-)classical
24More recently, a programmatic spacetime-free approach to algebraic quantum theory has been pro-
posed by Raasakka (2017).
25Even having such results might not settle whether entanglement is the relation in virtue of which
non-spatial elements make up a world for the simple reason that the exact nature of these elements
remains unexplored with the present focus on the world-making relation. This would, in other words,
be another interesting venue for further exploration.
26For details on how this issue in approached in algebraic RQFT, see the survey by Dieks (2001, section
12-13) and references therein.
27In its strongest form, the AdS/CFT correspondence is a duality between type IIB string theory
and N = 4 super Yang-Mills theory. For a more rigorous introduction to AdS/CFT and to some of
the philosophical issues that the correspondence raises, see Teh (2013), Rickles (2013), Butterfield et al.
(2016), and de Haro (2017).
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asymptotically anti de-Sitter (AdS) spacetimes (with a particular field content) and cer-
tain states of a conformal field theory (CFT) defined on a fixed spacetime background
identical to the asymptotic boundary of the dual spacetime.28 Hence, the CFT state is
defined in one dimension less than the dual spacetime.
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Figure 1: For the purpose of illustration, a spherical space with time, Sd×R, is depicted
here.
To introduce the Ryu-Takayanagi formula, consider a quantum state |Ψ〉 on the CFT
side with an AdS dual that features a classical spacetime MΨ. Define |Ψ〉 as a state in
the Hilbert space for a CFT defined on a spacetime identical to the asymptotic boundary
of MΨ which we denote ∂MΨ. We will also refer to ∂MΨ as ‘the boundary’. The non-
28More precisely, this is a particular limit of the AdS/CFT correspondence where the string length
on the AdS side is assumed to be much smaller than the characteristic length scale of the spacetime
background and the string coupling is much smaller than one (see Callan et al. (1985) and Huggett and
Vistarini (2015)). On the CFT side, this corresponds to the limit where the rank of the gauge group goes
to infinity and the t’Hooft coupling is large but finite (for further details, see Ammon and Erdmenger
(2015, chapter 5)).
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boundary spacetime, MΨ\∂MΨ, is referred to as the bulk. To construct the Hilbert
space, one must define a spatial slice of ∂MΨ which will be denoted Σ∂MΨ . We then
have |Ψ〉 ∈ HΣ∂MΨ .
Now, divide Σ∂MΨ into two spatially separated regions B and B, such that B ∪ B =
Σ∂MΨ (see figure 1). Since a CFT is a local quantum field theory, there are specific
degrees of freedom associated with specific spatial regions. We can therefore regard the
full quantum system as composed of two subsystems, QB and QB, associated with the
two spatially separated regions B and B. As a consequence, the Hilbert space of the full
system, HΣ∂MΨ , can be decomposed as a tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of QB and
QB. With this construction, we can, following the procedure of section 3,29 associate an
entanglement entropy to these subsystems which quantifies the entanglement between
the two subsystems in the state |Ψ〉.
The discovery by Ryu and Takayanagi (2006) is that the entanglement between QB
and QB as quantified by the entanglement entropy, SB, is proportional to the smallest
area surface on the AdS side, B˜, that divides region B from B, i.e. B from the rest of
Σ∂MΨ (see figure 1).30 The formula reads:
SB =
Area(B˜)
4G (5)
where G is Newton’s constant. While this Ryu-Takayangi formula is originally conceived
in the context of the AdS/CFT correspondence and therefore string theory, there are
indications that it generalizes and has thus recently been proposed to obtain in other
prominent prospective theories of quantum gravity: causal set theory (Sorkin and Yazdi,
2018),31 loop quantum gravity (Smolin, 2016; Han and Hung, 2017), and in the broader
context of generic group field theories via a relation to tensor networks with indications of
even further generalization (Chirco et al., 2018). Thus, any conclusions drawn from the
Ryu-Takayanagi formula alone appear to be more generic features of quantum gravity.
As observed by Van Raamsdonk (2010a), it follows from the Ryu-Takayanagi formula
alone that changes in the entanglement between QB and QB entail changes in the area
of the smallest surface that divides the two corresponding regions in the spacetime dual.
When all entanglement is removed between QB and QB, the entanglement entropy,
SB, goes to zero and so does the area of B˜ according to the Ryu-Takayanagi formula.
More explicitly stated, in this limit the bulk metric changes such that the minimal area
dividing the two asymptotic regions B and B in the spacetime goes to zero; the spacetime
connecting these two regions have vanished with the entanglement. For the spatial
surface Σ∂MΨ , figure 2 depicts the limit where all entanglement is removed between QB
and QB. The Ryu-Takayanagi formula suggests that entanglement between QB and QB
is closely related to spacetime connectivity between B and B in the spacetime dual.
29To repeat, this involves finding the reduced density matrix and then evaluate the von Neumann
entropy.
30More precisely, B˜ is the co-dimension two surface of minimal area whose boundary (“endpoints”) is
such that it separates B from B and which is homologous to B.
31Observe that this evidence is very conjectural and not quantum!
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More generally, it signifies that the physics described in terms of spacetime on the AdS
side is described in terms of entanglement on the CFT side.
B
B
B˜
•xB
•xB
SB→0−→
B
B
•xB
•xB
Figure 2: Depiction of the behavior of the spatial slice Σ∂MΨ when all entanglement
is removed between QB and QB. Note that the quantum state is defined on a fixed
spacetime identical to the asymptotic boundary of the spacetime dual. Thus, the change
in B˜ is solely due to changes in the bulk metric despite the appearance to the contrary.
Considering the mutual information in these scenarios provides a more direct relation
between entanglement on the CFT side and distance on the AdS side (Van Raamsdonk,
2010a). Define an arbitrary point in region B denoted by xB and one in region B denoted
by xB as in figure 2. For any operators OB(xB) and OB(xB) that only act on QB and
QB respectively, the following inequality holds (Wolf et al., 2008):
I(xB, xB) ≥
(〈OB(xB)OB(xB)〉− 〈OB(xB)〉 〈OB(xB)〉)2
2|OB(xB)|2
∣∣OB(xB)∣∣2 (6)
where I(xB, xB) is the mutual information between xB and xB (see eq. 4) and(〈OB(xB)OB(xB)〉− 〈OB(xB)〉 〈OB(xB)〉)
is recognized as a connected two-point correlator. On the AdS side, certain two-point
field correlators can serve as a direct measure of the distance between the points.32
Assuming, as above, that the AdS side is approximated by a classical spacetime, two-
point field correlators between boundary points33 correspond to connected two-point
correlators on the CFT side (Banks et al., 1998). Using this, one can relate the connected
two-point correlator in eq. (6) between xB and xB to the bulk distance, L, between xB
and xB (Balasubramanian and Ross, 2000):(〈OB(xB)OB(xB)〉− 〈OB(xB)〉 〈OB(xB)〉) ∼ e−mL (7)
32More precisely the length of the shortest bulk geodesic connecting the two points.
33To avoid divergences, these have to be properly regulated, see Ammon and Erdmenger (2015, section
5.4) for further details.
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where m is a constant. Removing all entanglement between QB and QB, it follows by
inserting eq. (7) into eq. (6) that the proper distance between xB and xB must go to
infinity. More precisely, I(xB, xB)→ 0 for S(B)→ 0. Thus, we get the following:
0 ≥
(
e−mL
)2
2|OB(xB)|2
∣∣OB(xB)∣∣2 ∝ e−2mL (8)
and 0 ≥ e−2mL iff L → ∞. Thus, when all entanglement is removed between the two
subsystems, the distance between any point in B and one in B goes to infinity. This
indicates that the mutual information between subsystems (of sufficient size) can account
for the spatial proximity of these subsystems (see Cao et al. (2017) for further details).
Based on the Ryu-Takayanagi formula alone, it has also been shown how a restriction
on entanglement entropy on the CFT side analogous to the first law of thermodynamics
is equivalent to imposing semi-classical, linearized Einstein equations on the AdS side
(Faulkner et al., 2014; Lashkari et al., 2014; Swingle and Van Raamsdonk, 2014). Again,
this signifies how entanglement can describe the same physics as spacetime (see Jaksland
(2019, section 5.3) for further details).34
A related field of research providing further indications of the relation between entan-
glement and distance is Maldacena and Susskind’s ER=EPR conjecture:
We argue that the Einstein Rosen bridge between two black holes is created
by EPR-like correlations between the microstates of the two black holes [...].
We call this the ER = EPR relation. In other words, the ER bridge is
a special kind of EPR correlation in which the EPR correlated quantum
systems have a weakly coupled Einstein gravity description (Maldacena and
Susskind, 2013, 782).
The conjecture, in other words, is that the same physical system can be represented
as two spatially disconnected, but entangled black holes or as two black holes spatially
connected by a Einstein-Rosen (ER) bridge. However, the relation, they speculate,
should generalize to all entangled particles, though the ER bridge will not in general
take the form of a classical spacetime. Still, the conjecture remains that entanglement
and ER bridges encode the same information about the relation between two particles
or collections of particles such as black holes.
In the spirit of the ER=EPR conjecture, Susskind has advanced the more universal
claim QM=GR, i.e. “the conjecture that where there is quantum mechanics there is also
gravity” (Susskind, 2017, 10). As part of this, Susskind has explored what might be the
34This also suggests a route for entangled subsystems to overcome the worry of Wallace and Timpson
(2010), who claim that “[i]t is opaque to us how semiclassical quantum gravity can be understood except
via a quantum ontology which treats spacetime as fundamental” (709). Their reasons will not be spelled
out here, since the resolution offered is simply to discard semiclassical gravity altogether (as a dynamical
spacetime) once it is realized that the gravitational dynamics can instead be encoded as dynamical
constraints on entanglement.
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quantum mechanical explanation for the gravitational attraction on a body from a black
hole and finds “that the gravitational attraction is nothing but the statistical tendency
for complexity to grow in chaotic quantum systems” (Susskind, 2018, 1). The account
is interesting, since it offers an alternative view of the radial direction in black hole
solutions as quantum complexity due to entanglement.35 In the quantum mechanical
representation of the physical system, rather than changing its distance to the black
hole, the ‘falling’ body instead increases its quantum complexity; despite the initial
appearance to the contrary, no movement takes place.
For a test-particle in the vicinity of an AdS black hole, the momentum, P , of the
particle in the radial direction grows exponentially in terms of the Rindler time, τ :
P = P0eaτ where P0 is the initial radial momentum and a is a parameter such that
a = 1 represents particles going into the black hole and a ≤ 1 represents time-like
trajectories for particles that never cross the black hole horizon. Trajectories with a ≥ 1
are non-physical since they represent particles travelling faster than the speed of light.
In chaotic CFTs, the size – as related to complexity – of operators grows exponentially
in terms of the boundary time, t, which is proportional to the bulk Rindler time such
that t = β2pi τ . The growth is controlled by Lyapunov exponent, λ, and one therefore
gets:
size (OCFT ) ∼ eλ
β
2pi τ . (9)
Thus, the size of the boundary operators grows at the same rate as the momentum of
the falling particle. This, of course, is no proof of a relation and might be accidental, but
the relation can be made a little stronger observing that λ ≤ 2piβ as shown by Maldacena
et al. (2016). The significance of this is manifest if one introduces a rescaling of λ such
that λ˜ = λ β2pi . We then have:
size (OCFT ) ∼ eλ˜τ . (10)
This rescales the bound, λ ≤ 2piβ ⇒ λ˜ ≤ 1, and manifests a rather remarkable result:
Not only does the size of a CFT operator grow at the same rate as the momentum of
an infalling test particle in the gravity representation of the scenario, also the bounds of
the respective growth parameters, λ˜ and a, agree. The trajectories that are non-physical
due to the Einstein bound on velocities, a ≤ 1, exactly correspond to the non-physical
growth rates as restricted by the bound on the Lyapunov exponent, λ β2pi ≤ 1. While this
is at best circumstantial evidence, it suggests how the bulk radial coordinate in black
hole solutions can be associated with complexity in quantum theories. The complexity
can in turn be related to entanglement: “the state complexity of |Ψ〉 is the minimum
number of gates required to convert it to an unentangled state” (Brown and Susskind,
2018, 38). This case study of a body falling towards a black hole therefore indicates that
distance may be described in terms of entanglement; something that is in accordance
with the picture already obtained from the Ryu-Takayanagi formula and the conjecture:
ER=EPR.
35Interestingly, this picture shares some similarities with Verlinde’s (2011) entropic gravity.
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6 Two distanced, entangled particles
Despite these expositions, it seems just manifestly wrong that distance supervenes on
entanglement. This is signified by the simple example of two entangled particles. We
can imagine changing the distance between such particles without changing the entangle-
ment between them which immediately appears to be a counterexample to the proposed
relation between distance and entanglement. However, it would be too quick to dismiss
entanglement as the world-making relation and generally entanglement fundamentalism
on these grounds.
First, observe how this is no more of a counterexample to the conjecture that en-
tanglement is the world-making relation than it is to the claim that distance is the
world-making relation. According to Esfeld’s ontology of distanced matter points, en-
tanglement is a “functional or causal role” (Esfeld, 2017, 14). However, it is difficult to
see how any functional or causal role recognizable as entanglement can be exercised in a
world of only two particles moving away from one another. Esfeld simply dismisses such
symmetric configurations36 as irrelevant, since “the actual configuration of matter of the
universe is not symmetrical” (Esfeld, 2017, 6). In any real example, these two particles
would sit in an environment of many particles. The ontology of entangled subsystem
can simply help itself to the same assumption.
Initially, this assumption looks absurd and thus appears to refute both minimalist
ontologies. Particles with constant entanglement and changing distance are not only
possible, they are actual; this is for instance used in experiments (e.g. Aspect et al.
(1982)) that demonstrate the violation of Bell’s inequality by measuring entangled par-
ticles emitted from the same source at spacelike separated points. But even though the
particles in the experiments are regarded as an isolated system, they do find themselves
in an environment. This is particularly vivid if we remember that particles in relativistic
quantum mechanics are to be treated as excitations of fields. Thus, even the idealized
form of the example is more appropriately cast as two entangled excitations of a quantum
field that moves away from each other. But following the results of section 4, generic
RQFT states are highly entangled, and the example will therefore include much more
entanglement than that between the two excitations; an effect that is only amplified
when the environment also features excitations, which it does in real situations.
Still, if we have two isolated particles such that their entanglement with the environ-
ment vanishes, i.e. such that they are only entangled with each another, then they would
arguably be unaffected by the environment. This actually discloses a deeper issue for
entanglement as the world-making relation: if entanglement is the only relation of the
ontology, then a completely disentangled subsystem is not, and can never be, related to
the rest of the system. Obviously, this questions in what sense such systems are even
subsystem, but if such disentangled configurations exist, entanglement cannot be what
makes it true that the disentangled subsystems are part of the same connected config-
uration which they obviously are. For entanglement to be a world-making relation all
36Though motivated by the problem how to individuate matter points with distance in symmetric
configurations.
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elements must be connected which precludes scenarios where subsystems are completely
disentangled from the rest. Thus, for entanglement to even candidate as the world-
making relation, no subsystem – such as that comprised of the two entangled particles –
can be completely disentangled from the rest of the system. But actual experiments are
carried out with isolated entangled particles which therefore seem to refute entanglement
as the world-making relation altogether. As a counter to this version of the example,
remember the intrinsic entanglement between a subsystem and its complement proven
in algebraic RQFT. This implies that it is impossible to isolate the two particles (excita-
tions) from their environment, since the environment, in this case, is the complement of
the subsystem comprised of the two particles. But if actual experiments do involve such
isolated particles, then this might be all the worse for algebraic RQFT. The isolation in
such experiments, however, is good enough for all practical purposes, but not perfect.
No perfectly closed systems can exist in quantum mechanics! Regardless of the care
with which these two particle states are prepared, they are inevitably entangled with
their environment.37 For the experiments in question, these entanglements are negligi-
ble, but in principle “radical non-separability of quantum states” (Howard, 1989, 248)
holds – due to the pervasiveness of the gravitational and electromagnetic interactions –
for all quantum systems except perhaps the universe as a whole. Moreover, since the
environment cannot be entirely decoupled, the entanglement between the particles will
inevitably decay over time and be replaced by entanglement with the environment (see
Mintert et al. (2005) for a review of entanglement dynamics).38
Thus, for this example to accord with our current best physics – in the form of quan-
tum field theory – the configuration must consist of two particles (field excitations) that
are almost maximally entangled, but with a deficit due to an ineliminable non-zero en-
tanglement with the environment where many additional entangled degrees of freedom
reside. Furthermore, the entanglement between the particles will dissipate over time
and therefore dissipate as they move away from each other.39 With these qualification,
such experiments are not counterexamples to the claim that distance derives from en-
tanglement: These experiments are rich in entanglement structure that even changes
over time. The example of two entangled particles moving away from each other at most
shows that the relation between distance and entanglement is complicated. However,
this was already stated above: It is not such that any distance relation can simply be
replaced by the entanglement between the distanced subsystems. This may appear to
be an ad hoc solution; certainly, if the distance between two objects is derivative from
entanglement, it must recovered from the entanglement between these two particles.
However, even in the ontology of distanced matter points the relation between distance
37In unitary quantum mechanics (such as the Everett interpretation), the two entangled particles will
moreover be entangled with the system that prepared them in this state. For instance in the cascade
transition, used by Aspect et al. (1982), the two entangled photons are the decay product of a highly-
excited calcium atom; a process that, in the terminology of the Everett interpretation, involves a splitting
of the universal wave function into entangled branches (decayed and not decayed).
38This effect is only further amplified by entanglement sudden dead phenomena (Yu and Eberly, 2009).
39Furthermore, Venugopalan et al. (1995) indicates a direct relation between the entanglement decay
and the spatial separation of an EPR pair.
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and entanglement is not that simple. In this ontology the same problem arises: Distance
can change while the entanglement remains constant.40 The solution in terms of dis-
tanced matter points is that the changes of relative position from which the entanglement
derives are among particles in the environment (or measuring device) and not the two
entangled particles (Esfeld, 2014). Adopting some terminology from Maudlin (2007b),
entanglement is not a metaphysically pure relation in the ontology of distanced matter
points: it does not satisfy the necessary condition that a relation is metaphysically pure
if “it is at least possible that the relation be instantiated in a world in which only the
relata of the relation exist” (Maudlin, 2007b, 86). Maudlin gives the example of being
siblings as a relation that is not metaphysically pure: siblinghood requires the existence
of other things, namely parents, and it furthermore depends on the existence of parent-
hood. In this respect, entanglement in the ontology of distanced matter points resembles
siblinghood: it requires additional elements than those entangled standing in additional
relations. We might even push this analogy further, proposing that siblinghood derives
from parenthood in the sense that it applies when a particular structure obtains be-
tween the objects standing in the parenthood relation. Likewise, entanglement obtains
for a particular structure of distance relations (and changes thereof). In the ontology of
entangled subsystems, it is distance that is not metaphysically pure.41 For two relata
to be distanced in this ontology, more elements than those relata are required. The
response to the counterexample is, in other words, that the changing distance between
two entangled particles is accounted for by changes in the entanglement structure of the
whole system including both the two particles and their environment thus mirroring the
way entanglement is accounted for in the ontology of distanced matter points.
This may come across as a rather vague solution to the problem of two entangled
particles moving away from each other. One might be suspicious of an ontology that
has nothing else to say about such a simple example. Below, we shall see that there is
indeed a little more to be said, though it remains at best schematic. First, however, the
intuition must be resisted that this is a simple example just because it is simple to formu-
late. Generally, “simplicity in ontology and simplicity in representation tend to pull in
opposite directions” (Esfeld, 2017, 7-8). Simplicity is deceiving; what is easily described
in terms of the usual full arsenal of representational devices might be a very complicated
situation once one restricts these to the bare minimum of a minimalist ontology. Indeed,
this complication obtains in the example of two entangled particles with changing dis-
tance and generally in any example that features distances; distances are very complex
constructions in the ontology of entangled subsystems. One might object that this just
looks like a convenient fall back position, however, it is not grabbed out of thin air.
In the context of AdS/CFT correspondence, most CFT states will not be holographic,
i.e. not have a dual with (semi-)classical spacetime (Rangamani and Takayanagi, 2017,
40Interestingly, Lam and Esfeld (2013) insists that “this fact does not justify the conclusion [...] that
the relations of quantum entanglement are somehow ontologically more fundamental than the metrical
relations that make up spacetime” (291). Arguably, the same should hold the other way around.
41Interestingly, Maudlin finds that the distance relation is not even metaphysically pure in distance-
based ontology. This further questions the viability of the scenario of two distanced, entangled particles
in a void.
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Chapter 13). For any CFT state we can (in principle) evaluate an entanglement entropy
for every possible subsystem of every possible Cauchy surface. By the Ryu-Takayanagi
formula, these can be related to areas of co-dimension two surfaces in the bulk. One
can then search for spacetimes that reproduce all these areas which will generally be a
highly overdetermined problem. Often, therefore, no (semi-)classical spacetime will sat-
isfy this, and quantum states that admit an alternative representation as (semi-)classical
spacetimes must therefore be expected to be rare. Those circumstances where there is a
spacetime dual, van Raamsdonk finds, are those that “have low-energy states which are
highly entangled” (2010b, 19). In addition, they must have a large number of strongly
coupled degrees of freedom and have large central charge (Rangamani and Takayanagi,
2017, 188). However, the details are not important. Rather, the point is simply that any
world that features (semi-)classical spacetime will, in the ontology of entangled subsys-
tems, be represented by a very rich entanglement structure between a large number of
underlying degrees of freedom and in this regard not be simple. In addition, even only
slightly geometrically different (semi-)classical spacetimes will correspond to quantum
states with very different entanglement structure due the significant overdetermination
of the spacetime by the entanglement entropies (observe in addition that this overdeter-
mination suggests how entanglement structure contains more than enough information
to encode spacetime). In summary, the apparently simple example of two distanced, en-
tangled particles is a highly complex situation in the ontology of entangled subsystems
because the manifestation of distance in the example requires very specific conditions to
be satisfied by a large number of highly entangled degrees of freedom. Even assuming
that these two particles are the only excitations of a RQFT in Minkowski spacetime,
in order for there to be Minkowski spacetime in the first place requires a very specific
and very rich underlying entanglement structure and in addition, already the vacuum
state of a RQFT on Minkowski spacetime is a highly entangled state. In general, (semi-
)classical spacetimes are by no means simple in an ontology of entangled subsystems
since the physics requires very many degrees of freedom for such spacetimes to even
exist. This also provides a physical motivation for the claim that distance is not meta-
physically pure in the ontology of entangled subsystems. Distance not only presumes
two additional elements – like siblinghood requires the existence of parents – but many
more degrees of freedom than those whose distance is inquired about. Together, these
features complicate the possibility of giving more than the schematic account below of
how the distance between two elements is recovered from entanglement.
The central claim in this schematic account is the point already made above: The
distance between two particles will generally depend on the entanglement between many
particles; possibly not including the distanced particles themselves (at least to leading
order). This may be exemplified by two large, entangled black holes, BHA and BHB,
under the assumption of the ER=EPR conjecture of Maldacena and Susskind (2013).
According to this conjecture, the two entangled black holes will under certain conditions
have an alternative representation as two black holes connected by an ER bridge such
that the precise nature of the ER bridge will depend on the details of the entanglement
between BHA and BHB (see figure 3). In the example, we assume that the black holes
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BHA BHB
Ent. dual⇐⇒
Figure 3: Depiction of two entangled black holes (left) and the conjectured dual repre-
sentation as two black holes connected by an Einstien-Rosen bridge.
are large – they contain many degrees of freedom – and are highly entangled.42 Denote
this configuration (I). Suppose we have pair of particles, a and b, that are almost
maximally entangled with mutual information I(a, b) and place the particles such that
a is in BHA and b is placed in BHB (see left hand side of figure 4). Since BHA
and BHB already contain a large number of highly entangled degrees of freedom, the
additional entanglement due to the pair of entangled particles will not change (at least
to leading order) the ER bridge connecting BHA and BHB. The distance between a and
b depends on the ER bridge, so since the ER-bridge is independent (to leading order) of
the entanglement between a and b, then the distance between a and b is independent of
their mutual entanglement.
BHA BHB
•a
•
bEnt
.
•a
•
bEnt.
(I) (II)
Figure 4: Depiction of two black holes connected by an Einstein-Rosen bridge where a
geodesic through the Einstein-Rosen bridge is shorter (left) and longer (right), respec-
tively, due to changes in the entanglement between the black holes.
Keeping the mutual information (and therefore the mutual entanglement) between a
and b fixed at value I(a, b), we can still change the ER bridge by changing the entangle-
ment between all the other degrees of freedom. In particular, we want the configuration
to be such that the ER bridge grows in length;43 call this configuration (II). Since the
distance between a and b depends on the ER bridge, the distance between a and b will
be larger in configuration (II) than in configuration (I). This, even though we, by con-
42Regardless of the initial entanglement between BHA and BHB , after a scrambling time (of order
M log(M), where M is the mass) BHA and BHB becomes scrambled and therefore becomes highly
entangled (Maldacena and Susskind, 2013, 794).
43See Maldacena and Susskind (2013, 789-790) for further details how this might be achieved.
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struction, have held I(a, b) fixed. Thus, in this scenario at least, the distance between
two particles can be independent (to leading order) of their mutual entanglement, and
it can be explained how their distance can increase without their mutual entanglement
changing (see right hand side of figure 4). The distance between a and b supervenes
on entanglement as required by the conjecture that entanglement is the world-making
relation, but it just happens to be independent (to leading order) of the specific entan-
glement between a and b. There is plenty of other entanglement with which to recover
this distance.
There is no reason to think that these observations do not generalize to other space-
times. In an ontology of entangled subsystems, those worlds that feature (semi-)classical
spacetimes and therefore distances were above claimed to have a large number of entan-
gled degrees of freedom; something that accords well with the abundance of entanglement
even in the RQFT vacuum state. Thus, even in the example of two entangled, distanced
particles, there will – just as in the black hole case – be plenty of entanglement and
degrees of freedom to account for the distance between these particles such that the dis-
tance can change while the entanglement between those specific particles remains fixed.
Thus, the counterexample is refuted.
7 Entanglement as the world-making relation
Together, the examples from section 5 offer a picture where what is usually described
as distance, space and extension can instead be described in a theory as entanglement
structure. Section 6 further disclosed that those entanglement structures that admit a
description as a space with distances were highly specific structures with a large number
of entangled degrees of freedom. Thus, distance can be described in terms of entangle-
ment, whereas most entanglement structures cannot be described in terms of distance.
This suggests a picture where distance supervenes on entanglement, and this is the sense
in which entanglement accounts for distance. Section 6 also indicates how this conjec-
ture can deal with – or at least is not refuted by – the most immediate counterexample.
On Esfeld’s minimalist ontology of distanced matter points, entanglement is a particular
sort of change of relative distance. With entanglement as the world-making relation, dis-
tance is a particular sort of entanglement structure and changes of distance are particular
changes of this structure in accordance with the basic tenet of supervenience.
Importantly, the conjecture that entanglement is the world-making relation does not
imply that distance, as the relation occurs in our theories, can just be replaced for in-
stance by mutual information; distance is not metaphysically pure in the ontology of
entangled subsystems. This is immediately evident by the difference in their structur-
ing properties (see section 3). But also in general, the relation between distance and
entanglement is much more complicated. This is signified by the example of the two
entangled particles (section 6). The distance between such particles can be increased
without changing the entanglement between them.
These remarks are indicative of a general point, mutual information is not the world-
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making relation, entanglement is. The developed ontology proposes that we should be
realist with respect to subsystems (as individuated by entanglement) and the entangle-
ment pertaining between these; thus largely mirroring the ontological picture proposed
by Lam (2013, 67-68). However, if mutual information is insufficient to capture this
realism with respect to entanglement, then what does this realism translate to in the
quantum formalism? What elements of the quantum formalism are ontologically signif-
icant if one adopts the ontology of entangled subsystems?
As it turns out, the procedures to recover space and generally distances in section
5 imposes the strongest requirements on the ontology. Here one of the central and
quantitatively most precise elements of the account of distance was the Ryu-Takayanagi
formula that relates the entanglement entropy of arbitrary subsystems to areas: That we
can evaluate numerous such entropies is for instance central to the observation that the
entanglement structure highly overdetermines any possible corresponding spacetime. In
the informal ontological picture, these entanglement entropies are supposed to be derived
from the fundamental entanglement relations among subsystems. In the formalism, the
entanglement entropy for a subsystem is evaluated from the density matrix of that
subsystem. This suggests that the density matrices of subsystems are the ontologically
significant elements of the quantum formalism in the ontology of entangled subsystems.
Promoting the density matrix thus, the ontology of entangled subsystems bears some
resemblance to the spacetime state realism defended by Wallace and Timpson (2010).
Here, the fundamental ontology consists of the density matrices of all possible subsys-
tems including the density matrix of the full universe such that the ontology features
non-separability at the fundamental level. However, as the name indicates, spacetime
state realism associates the density matrices with spacetime regions. Without space
at the fundamental level of the ontology of entangled subsystems, the subsystems and
their associated density matrices cannot be those of spacetime regions, but must be
individuated in another way. The two ontologies thus come apart.
However, the analogue to spacetime state realism can serve to ease the worry that
the ontology of entangled subsystems requires an esoteric ontological commitment to
matrices. As Wallace and Timpson (2010) observes, “the density operator assigned to
each [subsystem] represents the intrinsic properties that each subsystem instantiates”
(709). In the particular context of entangled subsystems, the density matrix is simply
a codification of the entanglement between a subsystem and the rest of the system and
any ontological commitment to this abstract mathematical entity should be seen in this
light.44
The ontology of entangled subsystems might come across as rather elaborate with its
apparent need to take the density matrix (i.e. the entanglement structure) of all subsys-
tems as primitively given; just as it is the case in spacetime state realism (Wallace and
Timpson, 2010, 709). To see just how elaborate this ontology is, notice that information
44The ontology thus comes close to a space-less variant of primitive correlations ontology developed
by Timpson and Brown (2010) with inspiration from Mermin’s (1998a; 1998b) Ithaca interpretation of
quantum mechanics.
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is lost when taking the partial trace. The density matrix of a system can therefore not in
general be recovered from the density matrices associated with a set of subsystems even
if these together comprise the whole system.45 Thus, when the workings of the Ryu-
Takayanagi formula require the density matrix for arbitrary subsystems, this promotes
the significance of the density matrices of all possible subsystem including composite
subsystems.
However, the density matrix for an arbitrary subsystem can (given a Hilbert space
with a basis for the subsystem46) be derived from the density matrix of the full system;
as observed by Ismael and Schaffer (2016) in the context of spacetime state realism:
“[o]nce we have a universe replete with parts, the only fundamental density operator
needed is the universal one” (footnote 23).47 Given such parts, Ismael and Schaffer
(2016) promotes what they call spacetime state realism streamlined (SSRS) where the
“fundamental ontology is that of the whole spacetime bearing a density operator” (21).
In other words, SSRS proposes that the density matrix of the universe as a whole and
the structure of subsystems is fundamental and that the density matrices of the sub-
systems are derivative. Similarly, in the ontology of entangled subsystems, it might be
ontologically more parsimonious to be realist with respect to the state of the full system
(as encoded by its density matrix). However, since this presumes “a universe replete
with parts” it is unclear whether this difference actually comes to anything.
8 Conclusion and quantum gravity
This paper has defended entanglement as the world-making relation. Defining entan-
glement in terms of the density matrix of a system and quantifying it by von Neumann
entropy, it was argued how distances – and with it possibly all other relations – can
be recovered from entanglement by means of resources coming out of quantum gravity.
Entanglement therefore promises itself as an alternative to distance as the world-making
relation. This, however, is more than an esoteric exploration of metaphysical possibility.
With serious contending theories of quantum gravity being fundamentally non-spatial,
this calls for the development of non-spatial ontologies. Without such ontologies, one
might worry about the metaphysical salience of these non-spatial theories of quantum
gravity. With a number of details still to be worked out, the ontology of entangled
subsystems will not silence these worries, but at least the account offers a way forward:
to replace distance with entanglement as the fundamental world-making relation and
thus to promote entanglement fundamentalism. The hope here is to have shown that
it is not unlikely that we can construct an ontology that is compatible with non-spatial
45A simple example is that the singlet state, |S〉 = (|↑A〉 ⊗ |↓B〉 − |↓A〉 ⊗ |↑B〉) /
√
2, and the triplet state,
|T〉 = (|↑A〉 ⊗ |↓B〉+ |↓A〉 ⊗ |↑B〉) /
√
2, give the same reduced density matrix for the one-particle subsystem,
TrB(|S〉 〈S|) = TrB (|T〉 〈T|) = (|↑A〉 〈↑A|+ |↓A〉 〈↓A|) /2.
46In more plain language, this involves knowing all the possible states that the subsystem might be in
if it were isolated.
47Obviously, it must be an implicit assumption here that each part (subsystem) is associated with a
Hilbert space such that the partial trace is well defined.
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theories of quantum gravity. While we have to wait for these theories to obtain to get
the details of this ontology, a sketch – entangled subsystems – has been defended here.
Theories that are fundamentally non-spatial do not pose an insurmountable obstacle
to the possibility of a coherent and empirically adequate (minimalist) ontology of the
world.
The account of how distance relations might be recovered from entanglement relations
was largely dependent on the Ryu-Takayanagi formula that relates entanglement entropy
to areas. Due to the origin of this formula in string theory, one might worry that
the ontology of entangled subsystems would be inappropriate for other approaches to
quantum gravity; for instance those that proceed by canonical quantization such as loop
quantum gravity. Both a direct and an indirect argument tells against this view. The
indirect argument was already mentioned above: the Ryu-Takayanagi formula promises
to generalize to most of the contending theories of quantum gravity. A more direct
response comes from a comparison between the ontology of entangled subsystems and
the emanating ontology of loop quantum gravity.
Central to the current best account of loop quantum gravity are spin networks. These
are structures represented by graphs with a spin (SU(2)) representation for the nodes
of the graph and one for the links. In loop quantum gravity, these spin networks are
conjectured to give rise to spacetime: “the spin network states are not quantum states
of a physical system in space; rather they are the quantum states of physical space”
(Wu¨thrich, 2017, 313). This is so since the nodes of the spin network can – via a
construction called twister geometry (Rovelli and Speziale, 2010) – be given a geometric
interpretation as quantum polyhedra (Bianchi et al., 2011).48 Due to the nature of the
spin network, the polyhedra are uncorrelated with one another. To relate the polyhedra
– these nodes of spacetime – and ultimately to recover the semi-classical regime of loop
quantum gravity, it has been argued that the polyhedra must be entangled; this has been
exemplified for nearest-neighbour polyhedra with indications towards a generalization
by Baytas¸ et al. (2018). Identifying the polyhedra with proper subsystems, the similarity
between this picture of loop quantum gravity and the ontology of entangled subsystems
is striking. While it may be circumstantial, it indicates that the ontology of entangled
subsystems is at least prima facie compatible also with the emanating ontology of loop
quantum gravity.
Indeed, it might seem that string theory is the theory of quantum gravity most at
tension with entangled subsystems if the subsystems are identified with matter points.
The fundamental object of string theory is the extended string and not a point as explicit
in ‘matter point’. Again, the commitment here is merely to those formal aspects of the
subsystems introduced above. In promoting entanglement as the world-making relation,
nothing has been assumed that obstructs entangled strings; the important element is
that they cannot be in space. The ambition is rather to indicate that it is possible to
have an ontology that does not feature distances on the fundamental level since we seem
48A polyhedron is a geometrical object that is uniquely described by the areas and normals to its
faces. The details of this representation of the nodes shall not concern us here. The interested reader is
referred to Bianchi et al. (2011).
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to be able to recover the distance relations from entanglement.
On this therefore we end: Entanglement promises to be a coherent and empirically
adequate world-making relation that can serve as the fundamental relation in an ontology
of the world; even taking into account non-spatial theories of quantum gravity. As will
be argued elsewhere, entanglement can support change, individuate the simple objects
of the ontology, but most importantly, entanglement can – as argued here – account
for distance (and possibly all other relations) and be the relation in virtue of which the
elements of the ontology – the subsystems – make up a world. Adopting entanglement
as the world making relation comes at the price of giving up separability. But those who
are ready to take this step should perhaps look to entanglement for the fundamental
relation with which to constitute this world (and perhaps all the other possible ones).
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